Editor’s Note: Rodrigo Guerra López delivered this paper on April 15, 2026, at the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences plenary session on “The Uses of Power: Legitimacy, Democracy, and the Rewriting of the International Order” — a video of his presentation is embedded below. He diagnoses how today’s neo-populisms, right and left, manipulate Christian faith for political ends, and sketches the genuine “theology of the political” the moment demands. –ML

Political Theology & the Crisis of Contemporary Democracy

The political manipulation of faith in contemporary neo-populisms

Plenary Session • Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences • Casina Pio IV, Vatican City • April 15, 2026

Introduction

One of the most telling signs of the historical moment we are living through is the growing difficulty in clearly articulating the relationship between Christian faith and political life. For several decades, it seemed that the dominance of secular humanism, scientism, and the global spread of the liberal paradigm had rendered such questions a thing of the past. However, history has once again demonstrated its capacity to surprise us. The crisis of contemporary democracy, the erosion of institutional mediations, cultural fragmentation, increasing polarization, and the emergence of left- and right-wing neo-populisms have brought certain fundamental questions back to the forefront: What happens when politics ceases to be understood as a penultimate, limited activity oriented toward the temporal common good, and begins to present itself as if it could offer redemption in history? Moreover, what happens when the Christian faith is used as a force for political mobilization to achieve that very purpose?

The issue is not marginal. In fact, some recent analyses of Latin America and the emerging world already acknowledge, without mincing words, that alongside corruption, social injustice, authoritarianism, polarization, and neo-populism, the “political manipulation of faith” also appears as one of the most significant challenges of the present. This observation is no small matter. It means that the current democratic crisis not only compromises the legal order or the functioning of institutions, but reaches the deepest level of culture, the collective imagination, and the religious dynamics that dwell in the hearts of peoples.

Therefore, it is not enough to denounce the irrationality of extremism or to lament the weakening of democratic consensus. We must go deeper and ask ourselves about the kind of absolutization of politics that reappears in many contemporary movements; about the way in which the category of “the people” is distorted when captured by binary logics; the way in which religion becomes, at certain junctures, a cultural emblem, an instrument of combat, or a means of legitimizing projects of power; and, above all, the need to develop an adequate “theology of the political” that, without dissolving the specificity of faith or privatizing it, allows for a truly free, historically fruitful, and democratically humanizing Christian presence.

Our intuition is as follows: the contemporary crisis of democracy favors the emergence of neo-populisms that tend to reactivate particularly flawed forms of political theology; these forms operate by absorbing faith into the logic of conflict and power, turning Christianity into an identity-based ideology or an instrument of mobilization. In the face of this, the decisive intellectual and pastoral task consists in recovering a “theology of the political” that, by affirming the distinction between the order of grace and the temporal order, makes possible a new Christian presence capable of contributing to the regeneration of democratic life.

1. The Crisis of Contemporary Democracy and the Rise of Left and Right Wing Neopopulisms

Contemporary democracy is under profound strain. This is not merely a passing malaise or a simple crisis of governance. What has been weakened is the fabric of mediations that for decades allowed for the articulation of political representation, institutional trust, public deliberation, and a certain symbolic integration of society. Adam Przeworski has observed that among the visible signs of the democratic crisis are the sudden loss of support for established parties and the decline in trust in institutions and politicians.[1] In turn, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have warned that extreme polarization can kill democracies when the adversary ceases to be seen as a legitimate competitor and is perceived as an existential enemy.[2]

In the region I come from, Latin America, this crisis takes on particular significance. Added to the fatigue of liberal democracies are persistent inequalities, multiple forms of violence, precarious economies, systemic corruption, the fragility of the rule of law, and a severe breakdown of social trust. It is therefore not surprising that recent studies have pointed to the simultaneous presence of polarization, authoritarianism, and neopopulism, alongside these factors, as part of the same epochal picture.

Neo-populisms do not spring up in a vacuum. They arise from the real suffering of broad sectors of the population who feel displaced, humiliated, or abandoned by political and cultural elites incapable of understanding the concrete realities of people’s lives. In many cases, the modern democratic promise degenerated into mere technocratic administration; representation ceased to be a living link between rulers and the ruled; and politics was reduced to the management of interests, strategic communication, or pragmatic adaptation to the global market. Where democracy is emptied of anthropological depth, neopopulism emerges, offering emotional intensity, identity, clear antagonism, and a narrative of redress.[3]

However, neopopulism should not be understood solely as protest. It possesses a more precise intellectual and moral structure. Jan-Werner Müller has insisted that the defining feature of neopopulism is its anti-pluralist character: the neopopulist not only criticizes the elites but also maintains, implicitly or explicitly, that he and he alone represents the authentic people. In this way, dissidents cease to be legitimate adversaries and become intruders, corrupt individuals, or enemies of the true social body.[4]

We have previously explored other characteristics of neopopulism.[5] On this occasion, we would like to highlight this aspect: the neopopulist distinguishes between who constitutes the “authentic people” and who does not. This trait can be found in both left-wing and right-wing neopopulism.[6] The former tends to sanctify the marginalized people as a homogeneous moral subject or as a misunderstood victim of history. The latter tend to absolutize the nation, tradition, the natural order, or the threatened civilization. In both cases, the political is imbued with a quasi-salvific intensity. The conflict ceases to be a tension inherent to any pluralistic society and transforms into a sort of “final battle” between good and evil. It is precisely at this point that it often becomes clear that the crisis of democracy touches upon the religious dimension of existence.

In other research, we have shown, for example, that the Latin American “new right” possesses a constitutive theological-political dimension, that is, an aspect that immanentizes the transcendent order of faith to achieve particular political objectives.[7] This element, together with the use of socioanalytic mediations incompatible with the Gospel, allows us to see the similarity between the old experiments in merging Marxism and Christianity and the contemporary “new right” and the new “far right.”[8]

Thus, the problem is not simply that some religious actors have political preferences, which is entirely normal in open societies. The problem arises when faith is absorbed by the logic of power, which turns it into a resource for confrontation, exclusion, or the legitimization of authoritarian projects, whatever their political orientation.[9]

2. The Nature of “Political Theology” and Its Influence on Contemporary Neopopulisms

The term “political theology” has various uses and therefore requires clarification. We are aware of the long history of this concept and refer readers to other studies for a more analytical exploration.[10]

In the sense that concerns us here, by “political theology” I do not simply mean theological reflection on social life or political life. The legitimacy of Christian reflection on “the social” or “the political” is beyond question. Rather, I wish to refer to that process by which the theological dimension and the political dimension tend to identify with one another or to realize themselves dialectically through one another. When this happens, politics is elevated to the bearer of ultimate meaning, while faith is drawn into the logic of immanence, conflict, and power.

When we consider the essential dimension of the Christian faith, we find that it contains a principle that resists such identification. Jesus Christ is not a doctrine or a set of values, but a Person who becomes an encounter—that is, a rational and relational individual capable of revealing not only a unique human-divine nature but also the Trinitarian character of a God who is communion. Thus, while for the Greeks the arché is, at best, a certain “unmoved mover” that provides the ultimate justification for the dynamism of the cosmos, for the Christian world, the arché is a Communio of Persons-in-relation, who constantly challenge us, revealing in the most immanent way their radical transcendence and irreducibility.[11]

Thus, Jesus Christ’s statement before Pilate—“My kingdom is not of this world” (Jn 18:36)—and the Gospel imperative to render to Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s (cf. Mk 12:17) introduce a decisive distinction between the order of faith and the order of the sword. The Christian message does not destroy the relevance of the political, but it prevents its sacralization: Christianity cannot be realized by identifying the civitas Dei with the civitas mundi; faith is essentially “metapolitical” and “transpolitical”: it possesses an origin that transcends power games, the world, and time. And thanks to this, it permeates politics and has consequences within it. But not in the sense that it realizes itself through power!

Political theology, in the sense in which we use it in this text, on the contrary, tends to close that distance. It can take traditional forms, such as theocratic or Caesaropapist, but also modern and post-Christian forms, in which politics becomes all-encompassing and turns itself into a sort of religion. This point is particularly important for understanding the present. Contemporary political theologies do not always present themselves in the guise of an explicit confessional restoration. Sometimes they operate in a culturally diffuse manner: they transform Christianity into a civilizational identity, reduce it to a moral repertoire, and turn it into a badge of belonging in contrast to others. In this way, the religious “seems to return,” but it does so already distorted by the logic of antagonism. At this point, the thought of Carl Schmitt resonates with authors on both the right and the left alike.[12] In other words, political theology quickly manifests as “theo-Manichaeism” that requires historical junctures, moments of “collapse,” radical adversaries, and a climate of war.[13] Precisely for this reason, the contemporary atmosphere—marked by crises of legitimacy, the spread of conspiracy theories, disinformation, and emotional radicalization—is particularly conducive to this peculiar “return of the religious.”[14]

Neo-populist movements capitalize on this context because they require a strong moral framework. A mere technocratic management of conflict is not enough for them. They need symbols, myths, enemies, promises of restoration, and visions of original purity. This is why religion can become a particularly effective fuel. In certain circles, Christianity ceases to be an experience of encounter with Jesus Christ and becomes a cultural emblem against migrants, Muslims, progressives, globalism, liberalism, or even against democratic pluralism itself. In others, Christianity becomes a discourse to legitimize a plebiscitary, clientelist, pseudo-social, anti-global, and anti-systemic narrative. In both cases, the Person of Jesus Christ, who demands to be attended to and understood as an irreducible and superabundant event, dissolves into a sort of moralistic pleroma—conservative or progressive, as the case may be.

3. The Problem of Political Theology: The Political Manipulation of Faith and the Absorption of Faith into Political Logic

The inevitable consequence of political theologies is the manipulation of faith. Manipulating faith does not merely mean improperly introducing religious symbols or discourses into an election campaign or holding a prayer meeting where hands are laid on the candidate. It means something more radical: redirecting the dynamism inherent in the Christian experience into a foreign logic—the logic of power, strategic calculation, and binary confrontation. Where this occurs, faith ceases to act as a critical and salvific criterion regarding the world and becomes a means of legitimizing the chosen faction.

The phenomenon is particularly delicate because it can be cloaked in pious language. In not a few circles, the political manipulation of faith does not present itself as a denial of Christianity, but as its most vigorous defense. People speak, for example, of Christian civilization, of tradition, of the natural order, of the defense of the family, or of a “culture war.” But, little by little, the center of gravity shifts. Christ ceases to be a living presence who saves and judges all idolatry; in his place appears a religiosity that serves the cohesion of the group. It is no wonder, then, that this “functional religiosity” blends moralism, semi-Pelagianism, conspiracy theories, and contempt for those who think differently.

For a Christian philosopher, such as the one writing here, the fundamental error of this scenario lies in the fact that faith is absorbed by political logic. The distinction between grace and nature, between eschatology and history, between the Church and the political community, does not formally disappear, but is emptied of meaning in practice. The eschatological reserve is lost; the Kingdom of God is anticipated in a worldly manner; the historical victory of one’s own side takes the place of theological hope. What in Christianity was meant to remain a judgment on all historical absolutization becomes the legitimization of a will to power.

This process also constitutes a peculiar form of secularization, as Massimo Borghesi has cleverly noted.[15] Not because the religious disappears, but precisely because, by being instrumentalized by the political, it becomes secularized from within. In other words, political theologies represent a formula for secularization: of the theological, when the civitas Dei is identified with the civitas mundi; and of the political, when it is transformed into political religion. Thus, secularization does not occur solely when religion is expelled from the public sphere. It can also occur when religion is preserved only as an immanent energy for historical struggle.

This phenomenon can be better understood when we examine how Hegel achieved the modern immanentization of Christianity. In his thought, the reconciliation of religion, philosophy, and history tends to conceive Christian truth as the realization of the Spirit within the unfolding of the world, which opens up the possibility of preserving religion as an immanent force within history.[16] However, when that immanence shifts from history toward polarized political struggle, Hegel ceases to be the decisive figure. At that point, political theologies animated by the friend-enemy logic—so characteristic of Carl Schmitt—come to the fore, in which the political acquires a quasi-religious intensity. Put another way: Hegel helps us understand the immanentization of the Christian; Schmitt helps implement its conflict-driven radicalization.

From this perspective, we can understand why political theologies end up simultaneously harming both faith and democracy. They harm faith because they reduce it to ideology. They harm democracy because they delegitimize pluralism, render civic friendship impossible, and normalize the figure of the absolute enemy. Where the adversary is seen as impious, corrupting, or a metaphysical traitor to the people, democratic coexistence becomes unviable. What is eroded is not only liberal tolerance, but something deeper: the capacity to recognize in the other a person with dignity.

4. The Need to Develop an Appropriate “Theology of the Political”

In the face of the theological-political temptation, the alternative cannot consist in privatizing faith. That solution, so characteristic of certain timid forms of conservatism and liberalism, does not resolve the problem either. Christianity is neither a purely internal experience nor a set of convictions without historical relevance. When lived fully, it inevitably radiates culturally, ethically, and socially. The challenge, therefore, lies not in expelling faith from the public square, but in adequately conceiving a “theology of the political.”

What does this mean? It means, first and foremost, recognizing that the Christian faith is not realized through political power, but it does have consequences for life in common. It is not identified with a project of historical domination, but it critically illuminates history. It does not absolutize any institutional form, but it helps discern which ones best respect the dignity of the person, the relational character of peoples, and the demands of the common good.

In this sense, an adequate theology of the political requires recovering several fundamental distinctions. The first is the distinction between the order of salvation and the temporal order. Politics does not redeem; it governs the imperfect. Its task is modest and, precisely for that reason, decisive: to create the conditions of justice, peace, and freedom that make a more dignified human life possible. When it forgets its limits, it degenerates into idolatry.

The second distinction is that between Christian presence and confessional hegemony. Authentic Christian presence does not arise from the desire to occupy everything or to impose a closed subculture. It arises from the freedom of a community that, inhabiting the “polis,” seeks to serve it from within. The civitas Dei lives in the “polis” without identifying with it; it cares for its good, it animates it, but it does not realize itself through organized action. Here lies a decisive key for our time. Christianity can be the soul of the “polis” without becoming a political party or instrument of the “polis.”[17]

The third distinction is that between the people and the masses. Neo-populisms require a homogeneous, morally pure people, united against the enemy. A theology of the political, on the other hand, needs to rediscover the people as a concrete historical subject—wounded, plural, torn by tensions, yet capable of sharing memory, culture, and hope. It is not a matter of idealizing the people, but of recognizing their real depth in the face of technocratic abstractions and ideological caricatures.

Finally, a theology of the political needs to rehabilitate ethical-legal mediation. Faith must not engage the political directly, but rather through prudent ethical-legal mediation. This observation is immensely fruitful. It means that the historical translation of faith does not occur through an immediate transposition of dogmas into programs of power, but rather through a patient work of rational discernment, public argumentation, formation of conscience, institutional building, social dialogue, and the pursuit of the common good in contexts that are always imperfect.

This “theology of the political” is outlined particularly in the post-conciliar social doctrine of the Church. However, it calls for creative developments within these parameters. These developments, of course, are not merely speculative extensions but rest largely on the possibility of re-proposing the beauty of the Christian faith as a credible proposal for personal and communal life.[18] Put another way, the reflective moment that surely needs to be expanded does not arise from mere declarations, from professional activists of Christian discourse or from more or less erudite posturing, but from the empirical and existential recovery of the Church as a living movement, as a people walking within history proclaiming that salvation does not come from a set of values, but from a living Person who becomes an encounter, and whose reality fulfills and exceeds the deepest expectations of the human heart.

From here, a new Christian presence in democratic life can emerge. Not a presence ashamed of itself, nor a tense and sectarian presence. Not a naively “neutral” presence, but neither a presence theologically captured by the mentality of “culture war” or “social resentment.” It would be a presence capable of proclaiming, from the integral liberation brought by Jesus Christ, that salvation exceeds what power can give. Likewise, it would involve vigorously affirming the centrality of the dignity of every human person, especially the most marginalized and despised; the importance of fraternity and communion as a method of coexistence and real political action; the relevance of democratic mediations—without idolizing them!—; the need, not only legal but cultural, for unrestricted respect for religious freedom; our urgent responsibility to care for our common home; and, in a very special way, the urgency of rebuilding the social fabric of our torn communities, particularly where antagonism has devoured trust.[19]

5. In Conclusion

The contemporary crisis of democracy cannot be understood merely as a technical or institutional problem. At its deepest root, it is a spiritual, cultural, and anthropological crisis. When politics loses awareness of its limits and when faith loses awareness of its transcendence and its missionary vocation, both become distorted. The former becomes a secular religion; the latter becomes an ideology.

Contemporary neo-populisms exploit this void. They do so by offering identity to disoriented societies, antagonism to wounded individuals, and a narrative of meaning to peoples who feel cast aside. But precisely for this reason, the risk they pose is greater: they tend to absorb the Christian faith into the logic of conflict, turning Christianity into an identity emblem, militant moralism, or a means of legitimizing new forms of authoritarianism.

In the face of this drift, the task is not to retreat faith into the private sphere nor to yearn for old syntheses between altar and throne. The task consists in thinking and living a true “theology of the political.” A theology capable of affirming the legitimate autonomy of the temporal order, the eschatological reserve of Christian hope, and the believer’s historical responsibility in building the common good. A theology that makes possible a Christian presence free from imperial fascinations and neo-populist temptations.

Only from there will it be possible to help restore the democratic-participatory life of nations. Not through a sacralization of politics, but through the religious and cultural regeneration of coexistence; not through the elimination of the enemy, but through the patient reconstruction of social friendship; not through a religion used as a weapon, but through a faith capable of inhabiting history without identifying with its idols. This is how, in my opinion, one of the most important responsibilities of Christian thought and presence in the present time begins.

* Ph.D. from the International Academy in the Principality of Liechtenstein; Professor and founder of the Center for Advanced Social Research (CISAV); Ordinary member of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences and the Pontifical Academy for Life; Secretary of the Pontifical Commission for Latin America. E-mail: rodrigoguerra@mac.com

Notes

[1] See A. Przeworski, Crises of Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2019, Introduction.

[2] See S. Levitsky and D. Ziblatt, “The Crisis of American Democracy,” American Educator 44, no. 3, Fall 2020, pp. 5–13.

[3] See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Latin America and the Caribbean 30 Years on from the World Summit for Social Development: Towards a Global Pact for Inclusive Social Development, United Nations, Santiago 2025; Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe Latinobarómetro 2024: La democracia resiliente, Corporación Latinobarómetro, Santiago de Chile 2025; C. Barreto Tapia, P. Castellanos López, J. Navarro Campos, D. García Luzón, and R. Guerra López, “Las nuevas derechas latinoamericanas: Configuración global y proyecciones seculares y eclesiales de las derechas extremas en América Latina,” in D. Meza – A. Ciurlo (eds.), Trayectorias cruzadas. Catolicismos y política en la América Latina contemporánea, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá 2025, pp. 553-582.

[4] Cf. J.-W. Müller, What Is Populism?, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2016, pp. 2–4 and 19–20.

[5] Cf. R. Guerra López, “Descubrirnos pueblo. Movimientos populares, populismo y la búsqueda de una renovación democrática en América Latina,” in Pontifical Commission for Latin America, La irrupción de los movimientos populares, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Ciudad del Vaticano 2019, pp. 161-183.

[6] See F. Aguilar (Coord.), Democracia y neopopulismos, CELAM-CISAV, México 2021.

[7] C. Barreto Tapia, P. Castellanos López, J. Navarro Campos, D. García Luzón, and R. Guerra López, op. cit.

[8] We refer to the most ideological and radicalized versions of liberation theology, for example, Hugo Assmann, Giulio Girardi, M-19, etc. In the Instruction “Libertatis nuntius” of August 6, 1984, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith rightly emphasized that two of the most problematic aspects of certain particularly troubling liberation theologies were, precisely, the tendency toward the immanentization of the Kingdom and the use of socio-analytical mediations incompatible with the Gospel.

[9] Among the wide range of works that, in various forms and ways, fuel the theopolitical dimension of some contemporary right-wing neopopulist movements – in addition to classic works by C. Schmitt, Ch. Maurras, R. Guénon, J. Evola, or J. Meinvielle – we must at least mention: O. de Carvalho, O jardim das aflições: de Epicuro à ressurreição de César; ensaio sobre o materialismo e a religião civil, Vide Editorial, São Paulo 2015; A. Dugin, The Fourth Political Theory, Arktos, London 2012; A. Laje, La batalla cultural: Reflexiones críticas para una Nueva Derecha, HarperCollins Focus, Buenos Aires 2022; S. Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism, Canon Press, Moscow, ID 2022; C. Yarvin, Unqualified Reservations, 2 vols., Passage Press, New York 2022; in the case of theopolitical thought that influences various left-wing neopopulisms, the following can be cited, among others: F. Betto, ¿Todavía es útil el marxismo?, Trotta, Madrid 2021; E. Laclau, La razón populista, FCE, Buenos Aires 2005; by the same author: Misticismo, retórica y política, FCE, Buenos Aires 2002; E. Dussel, Política de la liberación, 3 vols., Trotta, Madrid 2022; S. Žižek, The Fragile Absolute: Or, Why Is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?, Verso, Londres 2000.

[10] See, among others: C. Schmitt, Teología política, Trotta, Madrid 2009; P. Scott – W. T. Cavanaugh (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology, Blackwell, Oxford 2007; E.-W. Böckenförde, Cristianismo, libertà, democrazia, Morcelliana, Brescia 2007, Parte Quarta; B. Mondin, Teologías de la praxis, BAC, Madrid 1981, Caps. VI-IX; W. T. Cavanaugh, Theopolitical Imagination, T&T Clark Ltd, Edinburgh – New York 2002; J. Milbank, Teología y Teoría social, Herder, Barcelona 2004, Cap. VIII; J. Milbank, Beyond Secular Order, Wiley Blackwell, Chichester 2013; J. Ratzinger, Iglesia, Ecumenismo y Política, BAC, Madrid 1987, Parte III; D. Sureau, Una nueva teología política, Nuevo Inicio, Granada 2010; M. Borghesi, Critica della teologia politica. Da Agostino a Peterson: la fine dell’era constantiniana, Marietti, Milano 2013.

[11] See the now classic reflections on these issues in: E. Peterson, El monoteísmo como problema político, Trotta, Madrid 1999.

[12] Cf. C. Schmitt, El concepto de lo político, Alianza Editorial, Madrid 2009. To examine Carl Schmitt’s influence through two distinct yet relevant avenues for the topic at hand, see: Ch. Mouffe, En torno a lo político, FCE, Buenos Aires 2007; A. De Benoist, Carl Schmitt Today: Terrorism, “Just” War, and the State of Emergency, Arktos Media, Londres 2013.

[13] Cf. M. Belpoliti, L’età dell’estremismo, Guanda, Parma 2014.

[14] Cf. P. Francescutti, Teorías de la conspiración. Historia y sociedad a través del prisma del Complot, Comares, Granada 2024.

[15] See M. Borghesi, Critica della teologia politica, p. 13; Idem, La terza età del mondo. L’utopia della seconda modernità, Edizioni Studium, Roma 2020.

[16] See G. W. F. Hegel, Lecciones sobre la filosofía de la historia universal, Alianza Editorial, Madrid 2022.

[17] In this regard, it is always helpful to return to the pages of: A Diogneto, Città Nuova, Roma 2020.

[18] In our opinion, this is the central message of: Francis, Apostolic Exhortation “Evangelii gaudium,” November 24, 2013. Cf. R. Guerra López, “Cambiar el mundo. La dimensión antropológica y social de Evangelii gaudium,” in: A.A. V.V., La Alegría de Evangelizar. Un camino para la Iglesia hoy, CELAM, Bogotá 2015, pp. 115-147; Cf. J. Carrón, No hemos visto nada igual, BAC, Madrid 2024.

[19] See, among others: A. Rowlands, Towards a Politics of Communion. Catholic Social Teaching in Dark Times, T&T Clark, London 2024; R. Buttiglione, Modernity’s Alternative. How History is Formed in the Depths of the Peoples, New Polity Press, Steubenville 2025; R. Guerra López, Como un gran movimiento, Fundación Rafael Preciado, México 2006.

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