On April 2, Dr. Christian Brugger and Fr. Peter Ryan responded to my article on Amoris Laetitia, which itself was a reply to another article they wrote in Catholic World Report.

I must say that I truly appreciate their engagement. That said, their reply was disappointing. The debate, unfortunately, remains stuck at its original starting point—which was my gripe to begin with.

Still, it offers a useful starting point for further discussion, as it highlights the core issue: Brugger and Ryan make the same exegetical errors in interpreting my article as they do with Amoris Laetitia.

“Clear” Misinterpretations

For example, right at the beginning of their article, Brugger and Ryan say:

Before we reply to [Pedro Gabriel’s] central arguments, we would like briefly to address his titular claim that we are “Stuck in 2017.” If we are stuck anywhere, it is in 2016, the year the document was published, raising the sincere and serious concerns of so many faithful Catholics—concerns to which AL’s defenders have yet to offer a satisfying reply. Those concerns don’t go away with the mere passage of time.

But I never stated that concerns go away with the mere passage of time. What I did point out is that, since 2017, numerous responses have been made to these concerns—ranging from statements by the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith to articles in theological and canon law journals, blog posts, and books, including my own The Orthodoxy of Amoris Laetitia, which I cited throughout my original article.

Yet all of this is brushed aside with the claim that Amoris Laetitia’s defenders have “not yet offered a satisfying reply.” The phrase “stuck in 2017” refers to how critics like Brugger and Ryan wave these responses away and then proceed to repeat the same arguments as before.

Again, this was explicitly laid out in my previous article. It was also in my book. Brugger and Ryan bypassed it and merely reasserted what was already addressed. This is the sole reason why the debate remains stuck in 2016/17.

Ironically, if one reads the conclusion of my previous article, this is exactly the modus operandi I describe—creating “the false impression that the debate remains frozen in 2017 and that no reasonable counterarguments have been made. This echo chamber is, therefore, impervious to the very clarifications that Brugger and Ryan supposedly long for.”

In summary, the crucial context that adds nuance to my argument is ignored, leaving only a stripped-down phrase that they then strawman. This approach mirrors how they handle Amoris Laetitia.

(It is still noteworthy that the authors admit being “stuck” in 2017—or rather, 2016—which proves my original point.)

A more blatant example can be seen here (emphasis mine):

Just before his “Conclusion,” [Pedro Gabriel] asks whether sinners with diminished culpability should receive the Eucharist, and he responds, “If they are not in mortal sin, yes, they really should.” then asks, “But what if they are caught in a situation of sin?” Although that expression is not very precise, it is important to notice that he asks this question only after having dealt with sinners who are not culpable of mortal sin. It therefore seems clear that he is dealing with a new category, namely, people who are culpable of mortal sin.

In this paragraph, Brugger and Ryan construct an entire narrative in which I am supposedly dealing with a “new category” of “people who are culpable of mortal sin.” They even go so far as to suggest that it “seems clear” I did so—an example of how some critics of Amoris Laetitia tend to apply terms like “clear” and “ambiguous” in ways that reinforce their own interpretive framework instead of engaging the points on their own terms.

However, it’s far from “clear” that this is what I argued. In fact, it’s clear that I never did so.

When I refer to “people who are not in mortal sin” and then mention that “they are caught in a situation of sin,” I am clearly still talking about the same group— “they” (i.e., those who are not in mortal sin).

The reason why I go on to talk about “people caught in a situation of sin” was simply to tackle Brugger and Ryan’s hyperfocus on the “objective situation of sin,” emphasizing that even in such a situation, they are not in mortal sin.

Brugger and Ryan seem to perceive that their interpretation of my argument doesn’t hold, as they admit, “This claim contradicts [Pedro Gabriel’s] own understanding of the teaching of AL, for he calls it a misinterpretation to say ‘[t]hat Amoris Laetitia Allows Communion to Impenitent Sinners.’”

But this perceived contradiction doesn’t lead them to step back and reconsider that something is amiss with their own interpretation. Rather, they double down and say:

Nevertheless, his treatment of the matter leaves the reader wondering: Does he really mean what he seems to be saying—that unrepentant mortal sinners should receive the Eucharist?

This is clearly the opposite of what I argued throughout my entire article. My position has always been about people who are not in mortal sin. Yet Brugger and Ryan end up “wondering” if that is actually my stance.

Unsurprisingly, this is the same misinterpretation they project onto Amoris Laetitia—that it permits communion for those in mortal sin:

But these statements do not erase the document’s persistent ambiguous suggestion that some who are not invincibly ignorant or morally incapacitated may receive the Eucharist… One would think that it would state, or at least clearly imply, that Eucharistic communion is reserved only for those who do not meet the subjective conditions, properly understood, for mortal sin. But far from stating or even implying this, the document seems to suggest the opposite.

However, this is exactly what Amoris Laetitia clearly states and implies, never suggesting the opposite, as Brugger and Ryan claim.

In fact, the document goes to great lengths to explain the concept of mitigated responsibility. A whole section titled “Mitigating Factors in Pastoral Discernment” clarifies that “it can no longer simply be said that all those in any ‘irregular’ situation are living in a state of mortal sin and are deprived of sanctifying grace,” (#301) just a few paragraphs before the controversial footnote on receiving the Eucharist (#305).

In other words, Brugger and Ryan’s talk of “clarity” and “ambiguity” is irrelevant. What we are seeing is a kind of magnetic pull toward a predetermined conclusion that they inevitably reach regardless of how clear their interlocutors are: that anyone who disagrees with them believes people in mortal sin should receive communion.

This—rather than any real ambiguity—is the reason the debate remains stuck in 2016/17.

A Narrow View of Mitigated Responsibility

As I explained in my previous article, Amoris Laetitia hinges on mitigating factors that reduce subjective culpability, affecting full knowledge and consent, so that the divorced and remarried in question are not in mortal sin and can, therefore, receive communion.

Brugger and Ryan appear to understand this, as they state:

[Pedro Gabriel] claims that we exhibit a faulty conception of mitigated responsibility: “The problem is that Brugger and Ryan (alongside most of the critics of Amoris Laetitia) have an overly restrictive interpretation of what constitutes ‘invincibly ignorant or incapable of exercising their free will.’” Our response will make it clear that our understanding of mitigated responsibility is by no means overly restrictive.

Unfortunately, their new article proves precisely that, presenting a flawed and overly restrictive conception of mitigated responsibility. They do this in exactly the way I outlined in my first article.

For instance, Brugger and Ryan correctly acknowledge that Amoris Laetitia “makes statements to the effect that concrete factors can mitigate moral responsibility, that culpability is not the same in all cases, and that concrete circumstances should be taken into consideration when assessing whether these couples are free to receive the Eucharist.”

They even list the mitigating factors from the Catechism, which Amoris Laetitia explicitly cites in #302 as the basis for its sacramental discipline: “the promptings of feelings and passions … external pressures or pathological disorders… duress, fear, irresistible habit, hostility, anger, desire, severe sadness or other disorders of the will.”

However, they immediately shelve these factors—despite the fact that they are, I repeat, explicitly quoted in Amoris Laetitia—and instead gratuitously assert the conclusion they are magnetically drawn to: “But these statements do not erase the document’s persistent ambiguous suggestion that some who are not invincibly ignorant or morally incapacitated may receive the Eucharist.”

Brugger and Ryan revisit the list of mitigating factors later on, when discussing “full knowledge” / “sufficient reflection.” But why would “fear, hostility, anger, desire, and severe sadness” compromise full knowledge? Is it not more proper to state that they hinder full consent? What impedes full knowledge is ignorance.

The authors even inadvertently recognize this when they reference Aquinas, stating that “people under the influence of passions can act contrary to their knowledge.” In other words, they possess the knowledge, since they act contrary to it. What they lack is the will to act in accordance with it.

But when discussing full consent, Brugger and Ryan do not return to that list of mitigating factors from the Catechism. Rather, they mention only how “the violence of coercion and/or the influence of severe mental illness can render a person’s behavior, including objectively adulterous behavior, involuntary.”

Suddenly, all those mitigating factors that were previously mentioned are forgotten. Only coercion and mental illness are considered.

This is precisely what my previous article and my book referred to:

“[The papal critic] does not think full consent is im­paired in most situations. I theorize that many are influenced by a libertarian outlook, where the only way to coerce someone is through physical violence. However, libertarianism is a post-Enlightenment philosophy, and we wish to focus our attention into what Catholicism actually teaches. If we look at doctrine, we notice that orthodoxy takes a much broader approach to the question of impaired consent than the reductionist view limited to the non-aggression principle. . . Returning to the Catechism’s section on mortal sin, and reading what it has to say about full consent, we can see that “the promptings of feelings and passions can also diminish the voluntary and free character of the offense, as can external pressures or pathological disorders.” In the Catechism’s section on freedom, we can read that imputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished or even nullified, not only by ignorance, but also by “inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, and other psychological or social factors.” A man is only responsible for his acts to the extent that they are voluntary, i.e., done with full and free consent. Full consent must always implicate the will” (pp. 100—101).

Again, this was explicitly laid out in my previous article. It was also in my book. Brugger and Ryan bypassed it and merely reasserted what was already addressed. This is the sole reason why the debate remains stuck in 2016/17.

Brugger and Ryan, therefore, devote an excessive amount of time discussing how the accompaniment process proposed in Amoris Laetitia should dispel “erroneous conclusions.” They focus heavily on full knowledge, a strategy I also discuss in my book:

When confronted with how Amoris Laetitia bases itself in the sound and orthodox teaching on mitigating circumstances, the papal critic will usu­ally answer something like this: “Yes, ignorance may diminish subjective culpability; but in that case, the priest must inform the sinner of his sin, thereby dispelling his ignorance; from that point onward, this ceases to apply.”

This seems like an argument, but it is actually a set of two arguments melded together. In a fell swoop, the papal critic has

1. 1. Postulated that ignorance ceases to be a mitigating circumstance simply by informing the sinner that he is sinning;

   2. Very subtly swept “full consent” under the rug; only ignorance / full knowledge is being considered from that point on (p. 94).

In their article, Brugger and Ryan state that Amoris Laetitia rules out the mitigating factors (the same ones it explicitly listed, for some reason), since the “priest’s job is to help the person form ‘an enlightened conscience’ about what hinders the possibility of a fuller participation in the life of the Church. Since the hindrance to that fuller participation is the person’s living more coniugale, the priest is charged to help the person understand why that is so.”

In another section, Brugger and Ryan reference how Amoris Laetitia enjoins individuals to “undertake proper conscience formation,” claiming this means they should “first be reconciled in the sacrament of Penance” (overlooking the fact that Amoris Laetitia’s controversial footnote not only mentions the Eucharist but also Reconciliation).

This means that Brugger and Ryan believe that the “proper conscience formation,” helping “the person form ‘an enlightened conscience’” precludes the existence of mitigating factors.

They appear to treat this “conscience formation” as an instantaneous process, failing to consider that it is, in reality, a gradual one, unfolding over time. What happens sacramentally while this ongoing process is progressing is not considered. Moreover, this “conscience formation” is reduced to simply informing the sinner of Church teaching, helping the sinner understand it.

This is precisely what my previous article and my book referred to:

“Of course, the papal critic might counter-argue: if we are dealing with unintentional ignorance and no one is unable to understand the prin­ciples of the moral law, then all we should do is inform the sinner that he or she is, in fact, committing adultery.

As appealing as this might be, it is not so. It is a simplistic way of looking at reality. A person cannot be formally informed that he is sin­ning and, from that point on, be liable and fully culpable if he does not accept our explanation. Many papal critics seem to think this is an accu­rate description of reality, but the church herself has acknowledged how humanity is more complex than this” (p. 97).

Again, this was explicitly laid out in my previous article. It was also in my book. Brugger and Ryan bypassed it and merely reasserted what was already addressed. This is the sole reason why the debate remains stuck in 2016/17.

(Yes, I have repeated the above paragraph three times in this text, but it’s the sad truth.)

The authors seem to believe that mitigating factors don’t apply as long as the divorced and remarried people in question aren’t in a “heat-of-passion” state. They argue that merely feeling “between a rock and a hard place” or experiencing “great distress” excludes these mitigating factors.

However, these qualifiers don’t appear anywhere in the document. What is provided is a list of mitigating factors. If these factors are present in a way that impedes full knowledge or full consent—regardless of any “heat-of-passion” states—then the conditions apply.

In other words, Brugger and Ryan offer the very overly restrictive view on mitigating circumstances that they claim to reject.

Communion and Rejecting Church Teaching

Continuing their assumption that accompaniment consists solely in informing sinners of what Church teaching is, Brugger and Ryan object to how Amoris Laetitia quotes Familiaris Consortio—omitting the part that speaks of the duty of those in such situations to live in perfect continence (i.e., “as brother and sister”).

Again, this overlooks all the clarifications issued since 2016. For example, the guidelines from the bishops of Buenos Aires—which Pope Francis magisterially confirmed, stating that there are “no other interpretations”—include in no. 5 the “proposal of a commitment to live in perfect continence.”

Another example is the Lisbon notes, which in point 5.d) state that we must “always propose a life of continence in the new situation.” These 2018 notes were likewise confirmed by the pontiff, who wrote to the then Cardinal-Patriarch of Lisbon expressing that this reflection “filled [him] with joy.”

But then, why did Francis exclude this from Amoris Laetitia? First, he didn’t—as Brugger and Ryan themselves admit by quoting from the document:

In such situations, many people, knowing and accepting the possibility of living “as brothers and sisters” which the Church offers them, point out that if certain expressions of intimacy are lacking, “it often happens that faithfulness is endangered and the good of the children suffers” (footnote 329).

Secondly—and this is the most important point—this quote shows that those living “as brother and sister” are not the focus of the document. Francis affirms the value of continence, but he seeks to address another group—one that should also be considered within the scope of the new sacramental discipline, even if it was previously excluded from it.

Brugger and Ryan then overcomplicate what “knowing and accepting” means—precisely because they reduce pastoral accompaniment to a process of simply “informing.” If the sinner is properly accompanied and thus “informed,” how could they still fail to live in perfect continence?

What’s overlooked are the real-life difficulties these couples face—the very point made in the Amoris Laetitia passage cited above. Also overlooked, as previously discussed, is how these difficulties may diminish full consent to the point that the individual is not in a state of mortal sin.

Yet, if we consult the complementary documents referenced earlier, which guide the interpretation of Amoris Laetitia, this understanding is made clear. Both the Buenos Aires criteria and the Lisbon notes affirm that when the proposal of continence is not realized, but there are mitigating factors reducing subjective culpability, the sacraments may still be administered.

Herein lies the problem: because Brugger and Ryan hold that only the sacramental discipline of Familiaris Consortio is legitimate, they are unwilling to accept this cohort of sinners as eligible to receive Communion. In fact, they attempt to preemptively exclude them by arguing that even if subjective culpability is mitigated, they should still not receive. As Brugger and Ryan put it:

God is not limited to the sacraments and can, of course, give them grace in other ways, and we should pray that they receive grace. Indeed, we should pray that they receive the grace to recognize that the Church’s teaching about the requirement to conform their lives to the objective demands of the Gospel is inspired by the Holy Spirit and binding on their consciences.

But as long as they reject that teaching, they should not receive the Eucharist, which expresses the unity of faith of the members of the Body of Christ.

I can’t overstate how grave this statement is. Yes, God is not bound by the sacraments, but it’s undisputable that the sacraments constitute a particularly important vehicle of grace. God can give people grace apart from Baptism and Reconciliation, but we still urge people to be baptized and confess regardless.

In this sense, the Church has permitted these sinners to receive the sacramental grace they need to overcome their complex circumstances—while Brugger and Ryan, lacking any authoritative standing, seek to exclude them from that grace, and then pray they’ll somehow receive it anyway through other means.

This is particularly troubling, as Brugger and Ryan argue that these sinners must “recognize” and “not reject” the Church’s teaching before receiving Communion. However, Amoris Laetitia itself is Church teaching, and Brugger and Ryan do not accept it.

What we have, then, is a theoretical division of Church teaching into two categories: one set that can be rejected without consequence under the pretext of “theological concerns,” even warranting publications on Catholic news websites, and another set that cannot be “rejected” without “hindering full participation” in Christian life—even if, by “rejected,” we mean “accepted, yet the person fails to live according to this teaching, while not being fully culpable of such due to mitigating factors.”

Conveniently, the Church teaching that Brugger and Ryan reject always falls into the first group. They then non-authoritatively exclude from “full participation” in the Church those they deem to fall into the second group. They even appropriate for themselves the prerogative to deny these people access to a vital source of grace, while hoping God will fill the gap they’ve imposed.

To justify this stance, they ignore all the answers that seek to explain this clear and unambiguous Church teaching, dismissing them out of hand and recycling distorted arguments that misrepresent the real issue. Their persistence in this narrative—not any real ambiguity—is why they remain stuck in 2016/17, and why they will remain there unless they open their minds and hearts.

This article was originally published at Pedro Gabriel’s personal website. Please visit his site and learn about his books and other work.

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Image: Adobe stock. By Johannes Menge.