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Anyone familiar with the history of the papacy is aware that factions among the curia are not a new phenomenon; hence, the current factions regarding the papacy of Francis should not come as any surprise. The current dispute about his style of leadership seems, in some very conservative quarters at least, to reduce itself to questions regarding the nature of truth. In some ways this state of affairs is reminiscent of the tension between the vision of Pope John XXIII and a minority of Cardinals before and around the time of the Second Vatican Council. I don’t pretend to be able to shed a great deal of light on this discussion, but I can articulate a few important but often overlooked points about the nature of “truth” implied by the logic of plausible reasoning. This might explain why I am not particularly upset nor concerned about Francis’ recent statements critical of rigidity, ahistorical fundamentalism and the like.

The claim that Francis is sowing seeds of doctrinal and moral confusion is not entirely convincing to me. I don’t believe people are more confused and in the dark about doctrinal and moral matters today than they have been within the past forty or fifty years. Pope John Paul II and Benedict XVI were rather clear about certain matters, but only those who bothered to listen actually benefited from that clarity, and if my experience is any indication, relatively few bothered to listen. The situation has not changed all that much. Many who seem to have been listening to the current Holy Father have for the most part been engaged in “selective hearing” — they have really only been half listening. Moreover, why some Catholics believe that the election of a new Pope requires a re-articulation of moral and doctrinal matters covered by earlier popes, as if a new papacy implies a clean doctrinal and moral slate, is beyond me — perhaps they are looking at papal elections within an exclusively political and thus democratic model. I would argue that in some circles, the problem that some people are having with Francis’s criticisms of a certain epistemic posture stems, at least in part, from their inadequate understanding of the nature of reasoning and an overoptimism regarding our ability to achieve certainty. The following are a few thoughts on some of the epistemological implications of the reasoning process.

Consider an argument, whatever the issue. There is no denying that the conclusion of one’s entire argument about a particular matter is true if what is asserted conforms to the real; the difficulty here, however, is precisely in knowing whether or not one’s conclusion actually does conform to the real; for we do not have immediate access to many aspects of reality. Why some people overlook this difficulty is that they tend to confuse the definition of truth with the criteria for determining what is genuinely true. The former is simple: adequatio intellectus ad rem (adequation of the mind to the real), but the latter is rather complex — it is a matter of cognitive systematization, that is to say: maximal consistency, coherence, cohesiveness, functional efficacy and regularity, elegance and simplicity, etc. The two are not at odds with one another. If what someone argues is true, it will stand the test of time, but what we have typically is a conclusion that is implied by an entire set of data, and the data (the theses or premises) on which the conclusion rests each has, for the most part, only a degree of plausibility, that is, a plausibility index that is either minimal, moderate, or high — between 0 and 1.[1] One’s conclusion is typically the best estimate given the information available. “Best estimate” in this case means that the set of data on the basis of which one’s conclusion is implied is maximally consistent. Furthermore, the implied conclusion is an estimate because it is underdetermined — if it were not, there would be no debate — everyone would see it. But an argument is only as strong as the weakest piece of all the data that constitute it, as a chain is only as strong as its weakest link.[2] If the conclusion is true, then it conforms to the real and no new data will falsify it. New information could — and often does — alter our conceptual framework; the result is that a different estimate is suggested, one that is implied by a new maximally consistent subset of data.

This process occurs almost daily when it comes to our own quotidian knowing — it is just that the vast majority of people are not explicitly aware of the process; for there are a number of cognitive biases that keep people in the dark about this sometimes oscillating process involved in knowledge acquisition, in particular an availability heuristic bias, of which very many other cognitive/induction biases are variations. Moreover, if that new estimate resulting from further information is really false, then it only appears to be true at this point in time — it does not in fact conform to the real; we cannot see that at this point, because we don’t have the data, either empirical data or rational data (i.e., the right concepts, finer distinctions, etc.) — “seeing it” is something that inevitably occurs in retrospect. But such a false estimate will not stand the test of time — assuming that in time new information is forthcoming and will expose the error.

The reason context is so important in coming to a proper understanding of a text, biblical or otherwise, is that context is really nothing other than information (data), and new information can and often does introduce inconsistency into our current set of data, demanding that we discard less plausible data in order to restore consistency, the result of which is a new maximally consistent subset of data, or a new estimate. It is only when we get a firm grasp of the central and highly sensitive role that information plays in the process of plausible reasoning that we will come to appreciate the importance of dialogue, something Pope John XXIII understood very well — due, in all likelihood, to the fact that he was a professor of history. When dialogue occurs, perspectives meet, and perspective, like context, is information. Perspective is an analogical concept that is fundamentally spatial. If a person has never been to the Observation Deck of the Rockefeller Center, then that person has not seen New York from the perspective of the Rockefeller Center. When he finally does so, he sees the same thing (the city) from a new perspective. This new angle provides him with information that he otherwise would not have had. It is indeed the case that “each person has his or her own perspective” — much like “each person has his or her own interpretation”; for all of us see the world from our own unique perspective or vantage point. But what does it mean to have a perspective? I see my students from a particular and limited perspective, namely the perspective of a teacher, that is, within a student/teacher relation. That relation makes available a limited circle of information. A mother sees that same young man or woman from another perspective, namely that of a mother, and that relation makes available an entirely different albeit limited set of information. A perspective gives us an “angle” on things, and as a result of that angle, we see certain things that might otherwise be missed.

Thus, having a unique perspective means having unique information. To interpret is to understand something within the cadre of the limited information that one has, and to listen carefully to another’s interpretation of a work (i.e., of art or a piece of writing) is to have our information base expanded. It is very much like listening to another plausible explanation of a crime that has been committed; the detective is sharing with me the trajectory of his own reasoning process. He may have information that I don’t have, which is the reason his conjectures took a different turn from mine. His interpretation of the evidence might be wrong or it might be right, partially or entirely. But to listen to what he has to say is to allow my own set of data to become enlarged and inconsistent; it is now up to me to dismiss data that is inconsistent with the most plausible data now available to me. In other words, acquiring the “truth” is a social and collaborative process, not to mention an evolutionary process.

It is misleading to employ a mathematical argument as a paradigm instance of sound argument in non-mathematical areas of knowledge — mathematical premises are certain, and so too the conclusion, given that the reasoning is valid. It is also misleading to employ a simple and standard categorical syllogism involving indisputable data as a paradigm instance of a typical argument, such as ‘All men are rational, John is a man, therefore John is rational’. The major premise is known from within — through self-knowledge — to be virtually inarguable, and so the conclusion is certain. Knowledge is very rarely, if ever, so easy. A more accurate paradigm instance might be taken from sentential logic, each statement of which is assigned a plausibility index of between 0 and 1 (minimally to highly plausible). Historians tend to understand this, so too those in the empiriometric sciences, which is likely why historians, although they argue among themselves — not to mention scientists — , tend not to be dogmatic about the issues, but have a greater appreciation for the tentative nature of their conclusions.

The epistemological implications of the logic of plausible reasoning should be obvious — suspension of disbelief ought to be a normal intellectual disposition. In short, dogmatism is rarely warranted, for new information can and often does change the plausibility of some of our data upon which our initial inferences were based. That is why a highly opinionated dogmatism that habitually places complete confidence in one’s own perspective — as if no new information could possibly upset one’s limited conceptual framework — is an irrational and unwarranted posture. This is one obvious problem with fundamentalism, including relativism — relativists tend to be absolutists, inconsistently and aggressively dogmatic about their relativism. Our perspective is always limited because we are always information deficient, but that perspective requires perpetual expansion, especially in regard to “information sensitive” areas of knowledge, such as history, politics, economics, science, etc. The unique problem with today’s world is precisely this overconfidence and lack of readiness for new data, which is really an unwillingness to take in the perspectives of others — to regard those who hold different views as knaves and fools.

That is why I find nothing in itself objectionable about Pope Francis speaking out against “doctrinal rigidity” and “hostile inflexibility” or an “ahistorical fundamentalism.” He seems to appreciate that knowledge is not easy to achieve, especially knowledge of God. He writes:

It is not easy to grasp the truth that we have received from the Lord. And it is even more difficult to express it. So we cannot claim that our way of understanding this truth authorizes us to exercise a strict supervision over others’ lives. Here I would note that in the Church there legitimately coexist different ways of interpreting many aspects of doctrine and Christian life; in their variety, they “help to express more clearly the immense riches of God’s word.” It is true that “for those who long for a monolithic body of doctrine guarded by all and leaving no room for nuance, this might appear as undesirable and leading to confusion.” Indeed, some currents of gnosticism scorned the concrete simplicity of the Gospel and attempted to replace the trinitarian and incarnate God with a superior Unity, wherein the rich diversity of our history disappeared. In effect, doctrine, or better, our understanding and expression of it, “is not a closed system, devoid of the dynamic capacity to pose questions, doubts, inquiries. The questions of our people, their suffering, their struggles, their dreams, their trials and their worries, all possess an interpretational value that we cannot ignore if we want to take the principle of the incarnation seriously. Their wondering helps us to wonder, their questions question us.[3]

There is more truth to those final lines above than most people tend to realize, certainly far more than I could have appreciated within my first 10 years as a classroom teacher. The science of ethics, like all science, is subject to a complementary relationship between security and confidence on the one hand, and definiteness and detail on the other, what Nicholas Rescher specifically designates as Duhem’s Law of Cognitive Complementarity (s x d ≤ const).[4] I’ve been asked to estimate the price of a house across the street. If I wish for a very secure estimate, I would say the house is priced between $100 and 30 million. It is unlikely that I am mistaken, but my estimate provides very little information to a prospective buyer; however, a more precise estimate of the house would be $700,000, and that says a great deal about what the house is not (in the Toronto area), in other words, it is more informative, but it is more vulnerable to error — the house might be $750,000. Similarly, the higher the level of abstraction on which a certain discourse takes place, the greater the certainty we enjoy — that is why mathematics is quite secure and relatively free of ambiguity. As the level of abstraction descends, uncertainty and insecurity increase.

Science aims at precision on the first level of abstraction, which is why it is vulnerable to revision, while mathematics deals in necessities with respect to abstract quantities. Our knowledge of history is, in part, vulnerable to constant revision because history studies not general laws, but particular events (contingencies) and their relationship to one another, thus its conclusions are sensitive to new information. The science of ethics is subject to the same law: the more universal (general) the level of discussion, the greater the security, but as one aims for greater precision in its application to particular situations, a greater awareness of the possibility of important and relevant distinctions is required, and thus the more vulnerable to error one’s judgment becomes. Subtle truths, however, are easy to abuse, and so to employ these points — regarding the difficulty of achieving certitude — in an attempt to suggest that abortion, or lethal injection, or matters of basic sexual ethics are ambiguous and morally complex is nothing less than self-deception. Such maneuvers are reckless; they amount to seeing complexity where there is none.

Simple issues such as abortion or active euthanasia are not paradigm instances of standard moral reasoning, because there are no circumstances that could justify the intentional destruction of developing human life or the adoption of a proposal that includes the death of a patient (active euthanasia) — such actions are intrinsically disordered, and difficult circumstances do not alter that fact. These issues just don’t have the complexity that some people might want to believe they have; for they do not require principles much more specific than the general precepts of the natural law. Capital punishment, on the other hand, is an issue on which it is much more difficult to achieve a definitive conclusion, not to mention issues of international ethics.

And so in conclusion, I would emphasize that dialogue is important because it exposes our assumptions, which are part of the limited data set on the basis of which we observe the world around us — and we observe others and the world around us through those very assumptions.[5] The epistemic framework through which we observe and interpret the world around us is profoundly limited, perhaps unlimitedly limited, if that makes any sense — that science is an ever expanding frontier of ignorance might corroborate the point.[6] One of the biggest obstacles to the progress that results from dialogue is the habitual lack of awareness of the extent of our information deficiency and of the extent to which new data alters the conceptual framework in which we think. This leads to a lack of awareness of our mistakes. We make them constantly, but we tend not to notice, or we forget about them as quickly as we make them, missing the opportunity to reflect upon their epistemological implications. It is impossible to deny with any consistency that possessing truth is possible, but possessing truth is usually far more difficult than people typically believe it to be.

After two good popes who have been very clear and definitive about some of the fundamentals of ethics and doctrine, I believe it is fitting and complementary that we now have a Pope who challenges those who speak with a rhetoric of absolute confidence and who fail to appreciate the evolutionary nature of knowledge acquisition, especially theological knowledge.

Notes

[1] Nicholas Rescher. Conditionals. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2007. 63-64

[2] Theophrastus’s Rule runs: the strength of the conclusion (of a valid argument all of whose premises are essential to drawing this conclusion) must follow that of the weakest premise. Nicholas Rescher. Plausible Reasoning. Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1976. 24.

[3] Gaudete et Exsultate, 43-44.

[4] Rescher points out: “Duhem’s Law of Cognitive Complementarity means that it is going to be a fact of life in the general theory of estimation that the harder we push for certainty — for security of our claims — the vaguer we will have to make these claims and the more general and imprecise they will become. And so if we want our scientific claims to have realistic import — taking them to provide an account of how matters actually stand — we have to reconstrue them loosely. Take the atomic theory. We should not — cannot — say that atoms are in every detail as the science of the day holds them to be: that the “Atomic Theory” section of our Handbook of Physics succeeds in every jot and tittle in characterizing reality as it actually is. But if we “fuzz things up” — if we claim merely that physical reality is granular and that atoms exist and have roughly such-and-such features — then what we say is no longer subject to (reasonable) doubt.” Epistemetrics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. p. 7.

[5] Physicist David Bohm, who has written one of the finest works on the nature of dialogue, writes: “Normally we don’t see that our assumptions are affecting the nature of our observations. But the assumptions affect the way we see things, the way we experience them, and, consequently, the things that we want to do. In a way, we are looking through our assumptions; the assumptions could be said to be an observer in a sense. The meaning of the word “observe” you could get from defining “observation” as “gathering with the eye,” or “listening” as “fathering with the ear.” That is, everything in the room you are in is gathered together and comes to the pupil of the eye, the retina, and to the brain; or it may also come through the ear. So the observer is what gathers: it selects and gathers the relevant information and organizes it into some meaning and picture. And that is what’s done by the assumptions in thought. According to what you assume, you will collect and father certain information as important and put it together in a certain way, in a certain structure….assumptions are functioning as a kind of observer. When we observe we forget that, and we are looking without taking that into account. But this “observer” profoundly affects what it is observing, and is also affected by what it is observing — there is really very little separation between them.” On Dialogue. New York: Routlege, 1996. Chapter 5, “The Observer and the Observed” [Kobo version]. Retrieved from http://www.kobo.com.

[6] Physicist Richard Feynman writes: “You might ask why we cannot teach physics by just giving the basic laws on page one and then showing how they work in all possible circumstances, as we do in Euclidean geometry, where we state the axioms and then make all sorts of deductions. (So, not satisfied to learn physics in four years, you want to learn it in four minutes?) We cannot do it in this way for two reasons. First, we do not yet know all the basic laws: there is an expanding frontier of ignorance. Second, the correct statement of the laws of physics involves some very unfamiliar ideas which require advanced mathematics for their description. Therefore, one needs a considerable amount of preparatory training even to learn what the words mean. No, it is not possible to do it that way. We can only do it piece by piece. Each piece, or part, of the whole of nature is always merely an approximation to the complete truth, or the complete truth so far as we know it. In fact, everything we know is only some kind of approximation, because we know that we do not know all the laws as yet. Therefore, things must be learned only to be unlearned again or, more likely, to be corrected. The principle of science, the definition, almost, is the following: The test of all knowledge is experiment. Experiment is the sole judge of scientific “truth.” But what is the source of knowledge? Where do the laws that are to be tested come from? Experiment, itself, helps to produce these laws, in the sense that it gives us hints. But also needed is imagination to create from these hints the great generalizations — to guess at the wonderful, simple, but very strange patterns beneath them all, and then to experiment to check again whether we have made the right guess. This imagining process is so difficult that there is a division of labor in physics: there are theoretical physicists who imagine, deduce, and guess at new laws, but do not experiment; and then there are experimental physicists who experiment, imagine, deduce, and guess.” The Feynman Lectures on Physics. 2013 California Institute of Technology, 2013. Michael A. Gottlieb, and Rudolf Pfeiffer. http://www.feynmanlectures.caltech.edu/I_01.html


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Douglas McManaman was born in Toronto and grew up in Montreal. He studied philosophy at the University of St. Jerome’s College (Waterloo) and theology at the University of Montreal. He is a permanent deacon of the Archdiocese of Toronto and ministers to those with mental illness. He taught Religion, Philosophy and the Theory of Knowledge for 32 years in Southern Ontario, and he is the current chaplain of the Toronto Chapter of the Catholic Teachers Guild. He is a Senior Lecturer at Niagara University and teach Marriage Prep for the Archdiocese of Toronto. His recent books include Why Be Afraid? (Justin Press, 2014) and The Logic of Anger (Justin Press, 2015), and Christ Lives! (Justin Press, 2017), as well as The Morally Beautiful (Amazon.ca), Introduction to Philosophy for Young People (Amazon.ca), Readings in the Theory of Knowledge, Basic Catholicism, and A Treatise on the Four Cardinal Virtues. He has two podcast channels: Podcasts for the Religious, and Podcasts for Young Philosophers. He currently lives with his wife and daughter in Ontario, Canada.

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